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This submission confirms that the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1998 (CDPA) needs 
to be reviewed to comply with the Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances 2012 
(Beijing 2012) and the Performances and Phonograms Treaty 1996 (WPPT 1996).  
 
The submission also stresses that further evidence needs to be collected on the impact of 
the current UK framework of performers’ rights to ensure the implementation is based on 
evidence-based policy.  
 
 
1 Mathilde Pavis, ‘The protection of performances fixed in audiovisual recordings under UK law and the 




Need for reform  
 
The submission confirms that the CDPA should be modified to achieve 3 objectives:  
 
(1) Ensure full compliance with Beijing 2012 and the WPPT 1996 (in relation to 
performers’ economic, moral and equitable remuneration rights);  
(2) Improve the language and internal coherence of the CPDA to remove 
uncertainty in the interpretation and application of the Act (in relation to equitable 
remuneration and other provisions);  
(3) Guarantee the sustainability of the UK framework of performers’ rights in 
wake of recent global challenges including but not limited to the use of performances 
by Artificial Intelligence systems, online working, and new online contractual practices 
for the hiring and use of performances. 
 
There are gaps in the protection of performances conferred performers’ rights under Part 2 
of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1998 (CDPA). The gaps will need to be removed to 
comply with Beijing 2012 (to be ratified) and WPPT 1996 (already ratified). Other aspects of 
the CDPA are already compliant with Beijing 2012. This is because performers’ rights under 
the CDPA already apply to all performances fixed in sound recordings or films (i.e. audiovisual 
fixation), with only small variation of protection based on the medium of fixation. This point 
is further explained below (Section 1.5).  
 
Need for further evidence 
 
The submission also stresses the lack of evidence on aspects critical to the sound 
implementation Beijing Treaty 2002, including but not limited to:  
 
(a) Data on the revenues generated by existing performers’ economic rights across as 
a comprehensive range of performing practices;  
(b) Data on the revenues generated by existing existing performers’ equitable 
remuneration rights; and contrast these results with the revenues generated by 
author’s equitable remuneration rights 
(c) Data on the existing provision of collective representation for performers in the 
UK, including representation for the purpose of collecting royalties; and assess whether 
there is effective and comprehensive representation for UK performers.  
 
The UK IPO should therefore undertake further research on these points to formulate evidence-
based policies for the implementation of Beijing 2012. 
 
 
1.2. Structure of the submission 
 
The submission answers the questions set by the UK Intellectual Property Office (UK IPO) in 
the call for views in Section 2. Section 3 includes extended analysis and evidence in support 









1.3. Scope of the submission  
 
The submission excludes from its analysis: (a) rights conferred to persons with recordings 
rights per s.180(1)(b); (b) the regime applicable to orphan performances per Schedule 2; and, 
(c) provisions relevant to the cross-border application of performers’ rights and national 
treatment.  
 
The submission will not repeat on the insightful comments made by experts by: Prof. Tanya 
Aplin and Dr. Emily Hudson; as well as Prof. Charlotte Waelde on the need and interest of 
the dance community in the UK.2  
 
 
1.4. Evidence and state of knowledge on performers’ rights  
 
The submission brings evidence based on the author’s academic research on performers’ rights 
and the legal doctrinal analysis of the CDPA.3 Relevant sources of evidence supporting the 
argument developed in this submission are included in footnotes, and Section 4.  
 
Scholarship on UK performers’ rights is not as developed as scholarship on copyright.4 More 
problematic, is the absence of publicly available quantitative empirical evidence on the use of 
performances, performers’ rights and the revenues generated by them in the UK. This evidence 
is critical to produce a comprehensive and robust analysis of performers’ rights and measure 
the impact of existing and future statutory provisions. 
 
Representative organisations and collecting societies may be in the position to share valuable 
evidence with the UK IPO in preparation for the ratification of Beijing 2012. This information 
is not currently available or accessible to the public or independent researcher and which could 
not be gathered within the timeframe set by the call for views.  
 
 
2 Charlotte Waelde, Submission to the call for views on audio-visual performances to the UK 
Intellectual Property Office (Centre for Dance Research, Coventry University, June 2021).  
3 Mathilde Pavis, Submission to the UK IPO: Artificial Intelligence and Performers’ rights (Center for 
Science, Culture and the Law at Exeter, 2020); Mathilde Pavis, ‘Rebalancing our regulatory response 
to Deepfakes with performers’ rights’ (2021) Convergence (forthcoming); Mathilde Pavis, Huda Tulti 
and Jo Pye, ‘Fair pay/play in the UK voice-over industries: a survey of 200+ voice-overs’ (Center for 
Science, Culture and the Law at Exeter, 2019); Mathilde Pavis, ‘Runway models, runway performers? 
Unravelling the Ashby jurisprudence under UK law’ (2018) 13 Journal of Intellectual Property Law 
and Practice 867; Mathilde Pavis, ‘Copyright and performers’ rights in the creative industries; old laws 
for new challenges’ in A. Brown and C. Waelde (eds) Research Handbook on Intellectual Property and 
Creative Industries (Edward Elgar 2018); Mathilde Pavis, Charlotte Waelde and Sarah Whatley, ‘Who 
can profit from dance? An exploitation of copyright ownership’ (2017) 35 The journal of Society for 
Dance Research 96; Mathilde Pavis, ‘Is there Any-Body on Stage? A Legal Misunderstanding of 
performances’ (2016) 19(3-4) The Journal of World Intellectual Property 99; Mathilde Pavis, The 
author-performer divide in intellectual property law: a comparative analysis if the American, 
Australian, British and French legal frameworks (University of Exeter, unpublished thesis 2016) 
4 Legal doctrinal analysis is available but remains limited by contrast to the volume of scholarship 
available on authors’ rights.I am indebted to the important work of Sir Justice Richard Arnold on 





The UK IPO should collect evidence from industry organisations such as PPL, Equity, British 
Equity Collecting Society (BECS), PRS, Mechanical-Copyright Protection Society (MCPS) on 
topics such as revenue flows, contractual practices, and collective bargaining agreements.  
 
 
1.5. Terminology and approaches to protected performances under the CDPA 
 
It is important to stress that the level of protection granted to performances by the CDPA 
requires a two-stage assessment: (i) defining the performances in which performers’ rights 
subsist;5 and (ii) defining and identifying the acts controlled by performers’ rights.6 The acts 
protected by performers’ rights apply to all performances in which performer’s rights subsists, 




The CPDA does not distinguish between ‘audio’ (or performances fixed in sound recordings) 
and ‘audiovisual performances’ when defining performances in which performers’ rights 
subsist -- unlike international law on performers’ rights (WPPT 1996, Beijing 2012).  
 
Instead, the CDPA refers to live ‘dramatic performances’, ‘musical performances’, ‘readings 
and recitations of a literary work’ and ‘performances of variety acts or any similar 
presentations’ (s.180(2)) that may be fixed in a ‘recording’.  
 
Recording    
 
A ‘recording’ means a ‘sound recording’ or a ‘film’ made directly from the live performance, 
a broadcast of the performance (s. 180(2)(a)-(b)*).8 The CDPA does not refer to ‘audiovisual 
recording’ or ‘audiovisual fixation’ for the purpose of performers’ rights.  
 
A ‘recording’ can also mean a recording made directly or indirectly from another recording 
(s.180(2)(a)-(b)*).9 The fixation of all live performances is protected by a performer’s right to 
consent to making a recording of their performance (s.182), as an act controlled by performer’ 
rights. 
 
‘Sound recording’, ‘film’ and ‘broadcast’ in the context of performers’ rights share the same 
meaning as in Part 1 of the Act (copyright) (s.2011(1)). This cross-referencing is not 
problematic except for the treatment of ‘sound tracks’ by s.5B(c) which causes uncertainty in 
 
5 The definition of performances in which performers’ rights subsists is governed by sections 180 (rights 
conferred on performers), s. 181 (qualifying performances) and s. 191 (duration of rights). 
6 The definition of the acts controlled by performers’ rights are governed by s. 182 to s. 184 (economic 
rights), s. 205C and s. 205F (moral rights) with exceptions provided under s. 189, s. 190, s. 205E and 
s. 205G.  
7 See for example, s.205C(1)(a) and (b) applies to all performances in which performers’ rights subsist, 
but s.205C(1)(c) and (d) appears to be  limited to performances fixed in a sound recording. This 
provision will need to be reformed to comply with Beijing 2012, as discussed below in this submission.  
8 The numbering of the CDPA on s.180 prevents accurate referencing to different provisions of sub-
section 2. Here, the submission refers to:  and “recording”, in relation to a performance, means a film 
or sound recording (a) made directly from the live performance, (b) made from a broadcast of the 
performance, or (c) made, directly or indirectly, from another recording of the performance. 




interpretation when applied to performers’ rights (see Section 3 of this submission for more on 
this point).  
 
 
Definitions under Part 1 of the CDPA 
 
Sound recording means ‘(a) a recording of sounds, from which the sounds may be 
reproduced, or (b) a recording of the whole or any part of a literary, dramatic or musical work, 
from which sounds reproducing the work or part may be produced, regardless of the medium 
on which the recording is made or the method by which the sounds are reproduced or 
produced.’ (s.5A(1)).  
 
Film means ‘means a recording on any medium from which a moving image may by any 
means be produced’ (s.5B).  
 
Broadcast means ‘an electronic transmission of visual images, sounds or other information 
which (a) is transmitted for simultaneous reception by members of the public and is capable 
of being lawfully received by them, or (b) is transmitted at a time determined solely by the 
person making the transmission for presentation to members of the public’ (s.6(1)). 
 
Acts controlled by performers’ rights 
 
The acts protected by performers’ rights apply to all performances in which performer’s rights 
subsists, unless the CDPA specified otherwise.10  
 
A feature of the UK framework of performers’ rights is that the performer’s consent is required 
to (i) fixation the performance in a recording, and (ii) for subsequent use of that recording. This 
two-part approach to consent11 stems from the writing and structure of Part 2 of the Act, and 
is consistent with the approach to performers’ protection under international treaties (WPPT 
1996 and Beijing Treaty). This two-part consent to the performances was confirmed by UK 
case law in Bassey v Icon Entertainment Plc (1995).12 It is important that any modification of 
the CPDA maintains this approach to the acts controlled by performers’ rights.  
 
The rights to communicate, show or play in public a recorded performance provided under 
s.183 of the CPDA currently stand out as the only acts controlled by performers’ rights which 
do not require the performer’s consent for the subsequent use of the recording if the latter was 
made with consent. As explained and argued below, the CDPA should be reformed to remove 
the inconsistency of s.183 with the rest of Part 2 of the Act. This submission includes 






10 See for example, s.205C(1)(a) and (b) applies to all performances in which performers’ rights subsist, 
but s.205C(1)(c) and (d) appears to be  limited to performances fixed in a sound recording. This 
provision will need to be reformed to comply with Beijing 2012, as discussed below in this submission.  
11 i.e. the need to secure consent for the recording, and then again for the subsequent use of such 
recording 




2.  Answers to UK IPO’s questions 
  
This section directly answers the questions outlined by the UKIPO in the call for views. 
Further commentary support these answers with extended analysis and evidence is included 
in Section 4 of this submission.  
 
 
2.1. Questions on performers’ moral rights 
Question 1. Would this approach provide sufficient protection for audiovisual 
performers? 
Question 2. Would this approach result in any problems in the normal use of 
audiovisual performances? If so, in what ways and how could this be resolved? 
Answer  
Existing moral rights provisions need to be modified to comply with Beijing 2012 and 
WPPT 1996. Section 205C needs to be amended to include performances recorded in 
films, and Section 205F needs to be modified to apply to (all) live performances.  
See commentary in Section 3 ‘Extended analysis and evidence’ 
 
Question 3. Would this approach result in any problems for freedom of 
expression? If so, in what ways and how could this be resolved? 
Answer 
The approach proposed by the UK IPO in implementing Beijing’s standards for moral 
right protection of performances is unlikely to negatively impact the freedom of 
expression. The scope of moral right protection under UK law is narrow, and there is 
no evidence to date that existing provisions have stifled free speech or innovation.  
See commentary in Section 3 ‘Extended analysis and evidence’ 
 




The submission stresses the importance of reviewing the CPDA’s provision on 
performers’ moral rights in light of the challenges posed by online working due to 





2.2. Questions on broadcasting and communication to the public of performances in 
audiovisual fixation 
Question 5. To what extent do audiovisual performers currently benefit when 
their performances are broadcast or communicated to the public, including 
being played in public, in the UK? Is the remuneration that audiovisual 
performers receive for these uses appropriate? 
Answer  
 
The protection conferred by the rights of showing or playing a recording in public13 and 
communication (s.183) is weak and inconsistent with the rest of the UK framework 
of performer’s rights. The CDPA should be reformed to address this.  
 
The main limitation of the rights stems from the fact that the performer’s consent to 
making a recording (or copies thereof) removes the obligation to seek their consent to 
communicate, play or show the recording in public (s.183(1)-(2)). This limitation 
should be removed.  
This weak level of protection will have impacted the economic and moral or 
reputational benefit performers and their representative organisations have been able to 
generate in the past, and will hinder the economic and moral benefits performers would 
be able to generate in the future. It is difficult to imagine a digital and creative economy 
in which the playing/showing and communication of performances are not key to their 
commercial exploitation.  
The CDPA should be modified to read:  
Recommendation  
 
Section 183 of the CDPA should be modified to read:  
183 Infringement of performer’s rights by use of recording made without consent 
A performer’s rights are infringed by a person who, without his consent 
(a)   shows or plays in public the whole or any substantial part of a 
qualifying performance, or 
(b)   communicates to the public the whole or any substantial part of a 
qualifying performance. 
by means of a recording which was, and which that person knows or has 
reason to believe was, made without the performer’s consent.  
 
See commentary in Section 3 ‘Extended analysis and evidence’ 
 
13 The right of ‘showing’ or ‘playing a performance in public’ is the CDPA’s equivalent of Beijing 





Question 6. What would be the impact of introducing exclusive rights for 
audiovisual performers over these uses? 
Answer 
The introduction of exclusive rights to cover the right of communication and 
showing/playing will improve performers’ legal protection. However, a reform of these 
rights will not necessarily translate into a tangible benefit for performers. Exclusive 
rights rely on performers' knowledge of the law, contractual bargaining power and 
collective representation to generate benefits. Research reveals that performers do not 
have access to these resources (Pavis & Tulti 2019; Towse 1992; Taylor & Towse).14 
Performers will not be able to take full advantage of exclusive rights, if they were 
introduced, until these needs are addressed.   
See commentary in Section 3 ‘Extended analysis and evidence’ 
 
Question 7. What would be the impact of introducing rights to receive equitable 
remuneration for audiovisual performers over these uses (similar to those 
already provided for performances in sound recordings under section 182D of 
the CDPA)? 
Answer 
Research indicates that equitable remuneration rights applicable to performers do not 
achieve their aim (Pavis & Tulti 2019). This is attributable to their narrow scope of 
application as well as the reliance on the effective collective representation and 
collection of royalties on behalf of performers which is very uneven in the UK. These 
points need to be addressed for a regime of equitable remuneration rights to be effective 
generating fair remuneration for performers. 
See commentary in Section 3 ‘Extended analysis and evidence’ 
 
Question 8. What approach would you want the government to take and why? 
Answer 
 
There is a lack of clear, verifiable and peer-reviewed evidence to answer this question.  
 
 
14 Mathilde Pavis, Huda Tulti and Jo Pye, ‘Fair pay/play in the UK voice-over industries: a survey of 
200+ voice-overs’ (Center for Science, Culture and the Law at Exeter, 2019); Millie Taylor and Ruth 
Towse, ‘The value of performers' rights: an economic approach’ (1998) 20(4) Media, Culture & Society 
631; Ruth Towse, ‘The earnings of singers: An economic analysis’ in R Towse and Abdul Khakee (eds) 




Based on the current state of knowledge, we note that exclusive rights will benefit well-
known performers, or those enjoying a strong bargaining power; as well as, the less 
well-known performers who are well represented by their representative organisation 
or union who have put in place collective agreements with producers, hirers and 
distributors. Conversely, equitable remuneration rights will benefit well-known and 
less well-known performers, as long as the latter receive effective representation and 
effective coverage by a representative organisation collecting royalties on their behalf.  
 
Although useful, these pointers are not enough to come to a conclusive decision on 
which regime is better if the only option is to choose one over the other. More evidence 
on the current impact of equitable remuneration rights is needed to provide a better 
assessment of their potential contribution to the UK framework of performers’ rights. 
 
With this mind, The UKIPO should undertake further research into:  
(a) The state of collective bargaining agreements relevant to the remuneration of 
performers in the UK;  
(b) The current state and level of use of equitable remuneration rights by performers 
and representative organisations. This includes the use of the Copyright 
Tribunal by individual performers and their organisations, respectively, in the 
context of disputes related to equitable remuneration. 
(c) Standard contractual practices across various sectors of performance work.  
 
Representative organisations and collecting societies such as Equity, BECS, PPL 
should be consulted in the context of this research to access important data.  
 
2.3. Question on transfers of rights 
Question 9. In your view, should existing rules on the transfer of performers’ 
rights be maintained? If not, how should they be changed? Please provide any 
evidence to support your comments. 
Answer 
The protection of performers’ interests in transferring performers’ rights under 
existing rules is weak. It favours freedom of contract to the detriment of performers 
who are rarely in the position to take advantage of it, and lose the benefit of fair 
remuneration UK framework of performers’ rights aims to support. Existing rules 
could, and should, be modified to limit the freedom of contract where it does not serve 
or protect performers’ interests or policy of fair remuneration underpinning Part 2 of 
the CDPA.  
Presumptions of transfers may be envisaged if they are introduced in tandem with 
robust rights to equitable remuneration -- where the right to equitable remuneration 
shows to be more effective per Observation 12, Observation 13 and Observation 14 
made above.  
In any event, any review or reform of the CDPA should be careful to avoid fragilising 




See commentary in Section 3 ‘Extended analysis and evidence’ 
 
2.4. Questions on the protection of foreign performances 
Question 10. If the UK introduces rights of broadcasting and communication to 
the public for audiovisual performers, how should these apply to nationals of 
other countries that are party to the Beijing Treaty?  
Question 11. Do you have any other comments on how the UK should extend 
audiovisual performers’ rights to foreign performers or the impact of doing so? 
Answer  
The UK should consider extending the same level of protection to performers of 
signatory parties to safeguard the competitiveness of UK performers on the global 
market. This would mitigate the risk of producers and distributors favouring 
collaboration with less-well protected foreign performers (i.e. performers located in 
countries which afford a level of protection lower than what qualifying performers or 
qualifying performances would receive in the UK).  
 
2.5. Question on Other issues 
Question 12. Are there any other areas where you consider it necessary for the 
government to take action in the course of ratifying the Beijing Treaty? Please 
provide any evidence to support your comments. 
Answer  
  
We would like to draw the attention of the UKIPO to five considerations relevant to 
the implementation of performers’ rights in the UK:  
 
(1) Artificial intelligence and performers’ rights 
A revision of Part 2 of the CDPA should be mindful of uses of protected 
performances by or with the assistance of AI systems. Performers would benefit 
from a robust standard of protection rooted in strong economic and moral rights 
in this context.  
 
For more on this topic: Mathilde Pavis, ‘Submission to the UK IPO: 
Artificial Intelligence and Performers’ rights’ (Center for Science, Culture 
and the Law at Exeter, 2020) 
 
 





The review and reform of the CDPA to implement Beijing 2012 should be 
mindful of the fact that Part 2 applies beyond the creative industries and the 
heritage sector. Part 2 of the CDPA applies to most online workers, granting 
valuable protection to workers who record their voice, face and likeness in the 
context of their work (employment and self-employment).  
 
Most online workers would class as a ‘performer’ in the meaning of the CDPA. 
This is the welcome result of the broad definition of protected performances 
under the CDPA (Pavis 2018; Pavis 2020; Arnold 2016).15 
 
During the COVID19 pandemic, an unprecedented volume of live and recorded 
media has been produced by workers (employees and self-employed 
individuals) which would class as performances in which performers’ rights 
subsist. For example, this applies to teachers and lecturers who have sustained 
their curriculum online during national lockdowns. Many professions are 
expected to retain a greater share of online working as part of the normal course 
of business; and there will be greater investment into live and recorded 
performances by online workers as a result.  
 
(3) Online marketplaces and performers’ rights  
 
We draw the attention of the UK IPO to the growing presence of online peer-
to-peer recruitment platforms. These online peer-to-peer platforms or ‘online 
marketplaces’ have introduced Uber-like business models for the 
commissioning of creative content, and the hiring of performers. These 
platforms bring both threats and opportunities to the UK creative economy. 
Online marketplaces like Fiverr, PeoplePerHour, Quidjob or Upwork bring the 
phenomenon of ‘uberization’ to the creative industries.  
 
An important aspect of these platforms is their terms and conditions. It is 
common for online marketplaces to impose on artists using their services the 
outright assignment of all ‘new’ intellectual property rights to clients, without 
requiring proportionate or fair remuneration in exchange.  
Research indicates that their terms and conditions do not reference, signal or 
raise the possible application of equitable remuneration rights (Pavis & Tulti 
2019).16 This includes platforms operated by companies registered in England 
& Wales, or whose standard-form contracts nominate the laws of England & 
Wales as applicable to their agreement.  
The contractual practice of peer-to-peer recruitment platforms also indicates 
that full assignment of intellectual property rights are introduced without clear 
and transparent notification to the parties, without providing a genuine 
 
15 Mathilde Pavis, ‘Runway models, runway performers? Unravelling the Ashby jurisprudence under 
UK law’ (2018) 13 Journal of Intellectual Property Law and Practice 867; Mathilde Pavis, ‘Submission 
to the UK IPO: Artificial Intelligence and Performers’ rights’ (Center for Science, Culture and the Law 
at Exeter, 2020); Richard Arnold, Performers’ rights (Sweet and Maxwell 2016). 
16  Mathilde Pavis, Huda Tulti and Jo Pye, ‘Fair pay/play in the UK voice-over industries: a survey of 




opportunity of negotiation, and last but not least, without appropriate financial 
compensation. 
The fact that peer-to-peer recruitment platforms apply this practice to all 
transactions, and on a global scale, adds cause for concern. As such, the terms 
of use currently applied by peer-to-peer recruitment platforms hold the potential 
to defeat the purpose of the intellectual property framework, circumventing 
measures put in place to ensure equitable remuneration for protected artists.  
Existing rules on transfer of performers’ rights allows these new “Ubers” of the 
creative economy to circumvent the protection conferred to performers by the 
CDPA. This issue could be addressed in a review and reform of the Act.  
 
For more on this topic:  Mathilde Pavis, Huda Tulti and Jo Pye, ‘Fair 
pay/play in the UK voice-over industries: a survey of 200+ voice-overs’ 
(Center for Science, Culture and the Law at Exeter, 2019). 
 
(4) Provisions on ‘sound tracks’ under Part 1 of the CDPA 
 
Part 2 of the CDPA refers to Part 1 of the Act for the definition of ‘sound 
recording’ and ‘film’. This has the effect of extending the definition 
‘soundtrack’ under Part 1 to Part 2 of the Act.  
 
This is problematic in the context of performers’ rights as it weakens the 
protection of performers whose performances fixed in sound recordings are 
used in the context of a film, and the protection of performances whose 
performances fixed in a films is used as stand-alone sound recording.  
 
The CDPA should be reviewed and modified to avoid uncertainty of 
interpretation on this point and ensure that this is consistent with the aims of the 
UK framework of performers’ rights and Beijing 2012.  
See commentary in Section 3 ‘Extended analysis and evidence’ 
 
(5) Other difficulties and incoherences in the CDPA  
 
The UKIPO may want to take the opportunity of this review to remove other, 
minor, areas of incoherence and imprecision from certain provisions of the 
CDPA which complicate its enforcement and interpretation.17 An annotated 
copy of the CDPA recording these incoherences and areas of imprecision can 




17 Most of these areas of incoherence and imprecision have been documented by Richard Arnold in his 




3. Extended analysis and evidence 
 
Commentary to Question 1 and Question 2 
Three observations ought to be made to answer this question accurately and comprehensively:  
Observation 1 — references to ‘sound recording’ by Section 205C 
Aspects of Section 205C limit the scope of application of the right of attribution to 
performances fixed in sound recording. This will have to be modified to include performanced 
fixed in films to comply with Beijing 2012. With this in mind , the phrase ‘sound recording’ 
under s.205C(1)(c)-(d) and s.205C(2)(c) and (d) need to be replaced by the word ‘recording’ to 
ensure that the protection applies to all recorded performances.  
Observation 2 — no protection for live performances under Section 205F 
At present, the CDPA does not provide moral right protection against the derogatory 
treatment of live performances (s. 205F). This affects all performances whether they are 
destined to be fixed in sound recordings, films or broadcast. This is a result of the drafting of 
Section 205F(1) which only extends protection to broadcast and sound recordings played in 
public or communicated to the public. Section 205F(1) fails to comply with Article 5(1) of the 
WPPT 1996. This limitation will also affect the implementation of Article 5(1)(ii) of Beijing 
2012 if Section 205F(1) is extended to performances fixed in films without including live 
performances. 
Observation 3 — protection against false attribution 
The introduction of a right to object against the false attribution would be a welcome addition 
to the UK framework of performers’ rights. Such a right would prevent the use of a performer’s 
name in relation to a performance they did not execute. This is distinct from the non-attribution 
of a performer to their performance, or the mis-attribution of a performance to the performer, 
where the performer’s contribution is not accurately described. 
Observation 4 — Moral rights and uses of performances by Artificial intelligence 
Moral right protection for all performances will be critical to protecting the interests of 
performers and those invested in the production and dissemination of performances against the 
use of protected performances by Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems. In particular, we draw 
attention to the synthetisation of performances by AI systems (colloquially known as 
‘Deepfakes’) which pose a major challenge to the stakeholders protected under the UK 
framework of performers’ rights (Pavis 2020; Pavis 2021).18  
 
18 Mathilde Pavis, Submission to the UK IPO: Artificial Intelligence and Performers’ rights (Center 




There are outstanding questions posed by the use of performances by AI systems in the context 
of moral rights. For example, is the synthetisation of a performance with or by AI systems an 
infringement of performers’ moral rights? We tentatively answer that it is. Would or should the 
synthetisation of a performance be treated as the ‘normal course’ of exploitation?  
We think not. The UKIPO should carry out further research on these points to ensure that moral 
rights are compatible with innovation in the field of AI and performances.  
See also Mathilde Pavis, Submission to the UK IPO: Artificial Intelligence and Performers’ 
rights (Center for Science, Culture and the Law at Exeter, 2020).  
Observation 5 — Moral rights and the protection of online workers 
Moral right protection is also critical to online workers. Online workers are not typically 
regarded as ‘performers’ by the public or their employers, but are nevertheless protected as such 
under the CDPA (Arnold 2016; Pavis 2018; Pavis 2020).19 Workers to work online and/or 
remotely deliver protected performances via broadcast and recordings on a regular basis. For 
many sectors or professions, the ability to control the use of these broadcasts and recordings is 
critical to protecting workers’ employment, as well as other economic and moral interests such 
as their reputation. This is the case of teachers and lecturers for example.  
This should be taken into account as an added rationale for the implementation of a robust 
standard of moral right protection for performers for it will serve the interests of a very vast 
range of performers, not least teachers and lecturers.  
 
Commentary to Question 3 
This answer is based on two key points, outlined below.  
Observation 6 — Moral rights provide narrow provision 
Moral right protection provided by the CDPA has been interpreted narrowly by UK courts -- in 
relation to authorial works.20 This jurisprudence will guide courts in the interpretation of moral 
rights applicable to performers, as it has been in the case in relation to other provisions similar in 
 
response to Deepfakes with performers’ rights’ (2021) Convergence (forthcoming); Mathilde Pavis, 
Regulating Deepfakes using performers’ rights (Internet Newsletter for Lawyers, 19 January 2021).  
19 Richard Arnold, Performers’ rights (Sweet and Maxwell 2016) 63-76; Mathilde Pavis, ‘Runway 
models, runway performers? Unravelling the Ashby jurisprudence under UK law’ (2018) 13 Journal of 
Intellectual Property Law and Practice 867; Mathilde Pavis, Submission to the UK IPO: Artificial 
Intelligence and Performers’ rights (Center for Science, Culture and the Law at Exeter, 2020).  
20 Morrison Leahy Music Ltd v Lightbond Ltd [1993] EMLR 144; Confetti Records v Warner Music 
UK Ltd [2003] EWHC 1274; Tidy v Trustees of the National History Museum (1995) 39 IPR 501; 




nature.21 This technique of interpretation improves the internal coherence of the CDPA, and is 
expected to continue where appropriate.  
Observation 7 — Low case law related to moral rights 
There is no evidence or case law to suggest that moral rights protected granted to either authors 
or performers by the CDPA to date has stifled innovation. There has been relatively little litigation 
on moral right protection in the UK which could be taken as an indicator that there is no large-
scale, concerning use of moral right protection to limit freedom of expression.  
 
Commentary to Question 5 
The rights of communication and showing/playing a performance in public are weak because 
they are (1) narrow in scope, and (2) the unclear reference to ‘recording made without consent’ 
of Section 183 -- as explained below.  
Observation 8 — Narrow scope of application 
Recorded performances can be communicated or played/showed in public without the consent 
of the performer if the recording used was made with their consent (s.183). This limitation 
currently impacts the protection of performances fixed in sound recording and films. 
This is unlike other rights22 to control the use of a recorded performance whereby the performer’s 
consent is necessary at two stages: (1) for the fixation of the performance in a recording; (2) for 
the subsequent use of that recording, as per Bassey v Icon Entertainment Plc (1995).23 In this 
regard, the communication right and the right to show/play a recorded performance in public is 
an oddity of the CDPA by contrast to other protected uses of recorded performances under Part 
2, and to the corresponding right under Part 1 (s.19).  
There is no clear rationale for this difference in the standard of protection between different 
performers’ economic rights. It complicates the legibility and readability of the CDPA for no 
obvious benefit or justification.  
Observation 9 — Unclear language  
Section 183 has been described as requiring a two-stage assessment of the performer’s consent 
(or lack thereof) (UKIPO 2021; Arnold 2016): the performer must not have consented to the 
recording (presumably the making of the recording as per s. 182), and must not have consented 
 
21 e.g. Henderson v All Around the World Recordings Ltd & Anor [2013] EWPCC 7, para 48 per Birss 
J. 
22 See, the right to make copies of a recording (reproduction right right), to issue copies of a recording 
(distribution right), to lend or rent copies of a recording (lending and rental right) and to make available 
copies of a recording (making available right).  




to the subsequent use of that recording (the act of communication to the public, or the 
showing/playing of the recording in public).24  
This reading of Section 183 is only one of the possible interpretations of the provision. Other, 
more complex, readings of the same provision can be made. The heading and content of Section 
183 refer to two key phrases: (i) “use of recording made without consent” and (ii) “a recording 
which was [...] made without the performer’s consent”.  
(i) “Use of a recording” is not defined by the act, nor it is a term of art of Part 2 which refers to 
controllected acts in relation to protected performances (live or recorded) using different 
terminology.  
(ii) “A recording made without the performer’s consent” or a “recording” (of a performance) 
can refer to the output of two different acts controlled under Part 2 of the CDPA. There can be 
a recording that first fixes a performance (the original recording) requiring consent due to the 
fixation right. There can also be a ‘recording’ that is the copy of a recording of a performance 
(the copy) for which the performer’s consent is due to the reproduction right. The phrase 
“recording made without the performer’s consent” could refer to either act.  
In practice, different consent (or lack thereof) will be required depending on the recording used 
(original recording or copy), and the context in which these recordings have been made, to enable 
the communicating or showing/playing of a recorded performance in public.  
Scenario 1. If the performer consented to making the original recording, and that original 
recording is communicated to the public or showed/played in public without consent, s.183 is 
not infringed. A two-stage assessment of consent is required.  
Scenario 2. If the performer consented to neither the making of the original recording nor the 
making of copies, and that such copies are communicated or showed/played in public, s.183 is 
infringed (with the caveat that the person knows or has reason to believe the performer did not 
consent). A three-stage assessment of consent is required.   
Scenario 3. If the performer consented to the making of the original recording, but not to the 
making of copies of that recording, and that such copies are communicated or showed/played in 
public, s.183 should be infringed. Another interpretation would be inconsistent with s.182A 
(reproduction right). A three-stage assessment of consent is required.25  
Scenario 4. It is unclear whether s.183 is infringed in the event that the performer gave consent 
for the making of an original recording, or for the making of copies of such a recording for 
specific purposes other than, or not including, the communication or showing/playing in playing 
of the recorded performance. Arnold suggests that use of a recorded performance for a different 
 
24 UK IPO, Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances: call for views (23 April 2021) Available 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/beijing-treaty-on-audiovisual-performances-call-for-
views>; Richard Arnold, Performers’ rights (Sweet and Maxwell 2016) 164.  
25 In practice, it is possible that the performer’s consent to recording the performance (making the 
original recording) and their consent to making copies of that recording will be secured as part of the 
same agreement by the producer or distributor, for example. This would remove some of the complexity 




purpose when the recordings were made with consent in the first place appear not to be an 
infringement of s.183.26 We disagree. Whilst this interpretation is possible based on a literal 
approach to the provision, it would significantly weaken the right to fixation and the right to 
reproduction both of which are pillars of the UK framework of performers’ rights.  
Further, the interpretation of what consent was granted by the performer, the types of activities 
they have authorized in relation to the original recording, or its copies, may also be subject to 
principles of contract law on interpretation. Past case law suggests that where parties agreed to 
the transfer of rights for specific purposes or uses of the protected subject-matter, these 
contractual terms were interpreted restrictively by the court, in favour of the rightsholder (Pink 
Floyd (2010)27 on copyright).  
Recommendation  
For the reasons outlined above, the author recommends that the provision be modified to remove 
the uncertainty surrounding its interpretation. The UK IPO is encouraged to strengthen the 
protection afforded to performers and the rights of communication and playing/showing the 
performance in public uses to which their consent is required, subject to primary infringement.  
This can be done via the creation of exclusive rights to that effect, or an equally strong right to 
equitable remuneration.  
This recommendation will (a) augment the protection conferred to performers, (b) simplify the 
interpretation of s.183; (c) improve consistency and coherence within Part 2 of the CDPA; and 
(d) improve coherence and consistency between Part 1 and Part 2 of the CDPA.  
With this in mind, the CDPA should be modified to read:  
183 Infringement of performer’s rights by use of recording made without consent 
A performer’s rights are infringed by a person who, without his consent 
(a)   shows or plays in public the whole or any substantial part of a qualifying 
performance, or 
(b)   communicates to the public the whole or any substantial part of a 
qualifying performance. 
by means of a recording which was, and which that person knows or has 




26 Richard Arnold, Performers’ rights (Sweet and Maxwell, 2016) 164. 





Commentary to Question 6 
Observation 10 — Performers’ lack of awareness on their rights 
Research records that performers are not well aware of their intellectual property rights, and how 
these rights operate to their advantage in practice (Pavis & Tulti 2019).28 This lack of knowledge 
and awareness negatively impacts performers’ capacity to negotiate their rights (exclusive or 
other).  
This has two key consequences: (a) existing performers’ rights currently appear under-used by 
performers; (b) performers’ rights are acquired in full and perpetuity by those who deal with 
performers (where such transfers are possible). Consequently, individual performers will not be 
in the position to take advantage of exclusive rights unless they possess or have access to 
knowledge of their intellectual rights and enjoy the contractual bargaining power to put such 
knowledge into application. This is to the exception of well-known performers, who represent a 
small minority amongst the performers protected by the CDPA.  
This state of play will impact the effectiveness and implementation of Beijing 2012 into the 
CPDA, in practice. It should be taken into account when deciding whether to implement exclusive 
rights or a right to equitable remuneration in this instance. This should not be a factor deterring 
the reform because augmented levels of protection are likely to increase performers’ awareness 
of their rights, especially if the reform simplifies the UK framework for performers’ rights.   
Observation 11 — collective bargaining agreements  
Qualitative research indicates that exclusive rights are well utilized where collective bargaining 
agreements have been struck between organisations representing performers, producers and 
distributors. In this instance, it is our understanding that exclusive rights exploited via collective 
bargaining agreements have achieved higher levels of remuneration for the performers concerned 
in comparison to existing provisions on equitable remuneration. This observation mitigates 
Observation 12 (below). Representative organisations, like Equity, who have been able to put in 







28  Mathilde Pavis, Huda Tulti and Jo Pye, ‘Fair pay/play in the UK voice-over industries: a 




Commentary to Question 7 
Observation 12 — Narrow scope of application  
The existing regime of equitable remuneration rights is too narrow and complex in its application. 
This could be addressed in a reform of the CDPA, should this strategy for the implementation of 
Article 11 of Beijing 2012  be adopted in the UK.  
The narrow scope of application of existing equitable remuneration rights for performers have 
significant practical impact on the performers and the organisation of the sector. First, for the 
rights are narrow and complex they are less well-known compared to other rights, which reduces 
compliance by the relevant parties. Second, the rights are too narrow in scope to be worth the 
expense of pursuing enforcement before the court by performers themselves, or by representative 
organisations on behalf of protected performers. The costs of litigation outweighs the benefits the 
rights once enforced. Third, the rights are too narrow to generate sufficient incentive for 
representative organisations to invest in collecting equitable remuneration where it is due, and 
campaign for greater awareness and education. This leads to a loss of revenues for performers, 
and income taxable in the UK.  
Observation 13 — Complex scope of application 
The regime of equitable remuneration rights is complex. The complexity stems from: (a) the 
absence of a clear definition for what constitutes ‘equitable remuneration’ and ‘commercially 
published’29; (b) unclear references to ‘the owner of the copyright in the sound recording’  or 
‘successors’30 as the persons responsible for paying equitable remuneration; and (c) the 
application of equitable remuneration in the context of cross-border exploitation of protected 
performances is unclear.  
This complexity impacts the implementation and enforcement of these rights via contracts or 
before the Copyright Tribunal by performers or their representative organisations. This 
complexity deters use and litigation in the event of infringement.  
Lack of definition of ‘equitable remuneration’ or ‘commercially published’ 
Neither ‘equitable remuneration’ nor ‘commercially published’ are phrases defined by the CDPA 
despite the fact that they are critical to the enforcement of the rights.  
Case law from the ECJ gave a list of factors national courts ought to take into account in 
determining what amounts to ‘equitable remuneration’ on a case-by-base basis (e.g. C-245/00 
Stichting referring to fixed and variable factors; Case-192/04 Lagardere referring to the use in 
trade taking into account all relevant parameters including actual and potential audience; Case-
271/10 Vereniging on flat fees for the remuneration regarding public lending). The Copyright 
Tribunal has produced little to no jurisprudence on the matter. The UK will lose the assistance 
and guidance of the ECJ on this point due to Brexit. EU case law and regulations will be of little 







based on Beijing 2012. The UK will need to fill this gap in knowledge about the meaning of 
‘equitable remuneration’ if new provisions are introduced. This guidance will also be useful for 
the interpretation of existing provisions of equitable remuneration.  
Such guidance can come in the form of new statutory provisions within the CDPA or non-binding 
guidance issued by the UK IPO to support parties dealing with performances protected by 
equitable remuneration. The UK IPO is encouraged to draw on, and adapt, the ECJ’s approach to 
the definition of ‘equitable remuneration’. 
‘The owner of the copyright in the sound recording’ 
The CDPA points to the ‘owner of the copyright in the sound recording’ as the party responsible 
for discharging the performer’s right to equitable remuneration. It would be accurate and 
adequAte for the CDPA to refer to the person receiving the benefits of the commercialisation of 
the sound recording as the party responsible for paying equitable remuneration to the performer 
(Arnold 2016: 120).31 This is because the owner of the copyright in the sound recording may not 
necessarily be the person who is commercially exploiting the sound recording. Similarly, the 
performer themselves may be the copyright owner in the sound recording.  
Experts have proposed that references to the ‘owner of the copyright in the sound recording’ be 
replaced with a reference to the person who enjoys the exclusive right to authorize the use of the 
sound recording (Arnold 2016; Laddie, Prescott & Vitoria 2011).32 Similarly, the reference to 
“successor” under S.191G(3) as parties liable for the payment of equitable remuneration to 
performers is not clear. There is no definition of the term in the CDPA (Arnold 2016).33 
The implementation of Beijing 2012 would be a good opportunity to make this modification; 
especially if equitable remuneration rights are to be extended to performances fixed in films.  
Cross-border application of equitable remuneration rights 
The CDPA is unclear on the application of equitable remuneration rights in the context of cross-
border contract and the cross-border exploitation of protected performances. Do equitable 
remuneration rights arise per the place of the commercialisation of the performance, per the 
presence of a qualifying performer or  a qualifying performance in the meaning of the CDPA? 
Can a UK performer based in the UK claim a right to equitable remuneration for the exploitation 
of their work overseas?  
A reform of the CDPA bringing greater clarity on the cross-border application of equitable 
remuneration rights would be a welcome development of the law and a major contributor to the 
success of equitable remuneration rights under the UK framework of performers’ rights.  
 
 
31 Richard Arnold, Performers’ rights (Sweet and Maxwell, 2016) 120, citing Laddie, Prescott and 
Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs (Butterworths 2011, 4th edn).  
32 Richard Arnold, Performers’ rights (Sweet and Maxwell, 2016) 120, citing Laddie, Prescott and 
Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs (Butterworths 2011, 4th edn).  




Observation 14 — lack of collective and collecting representation 
Equitable remuneration rights relies, in large part, on the collective representation of performers 
by a collecting society. The collective representation of performers (as defined in the CDPA) in 
the UK is uneven. The breadth of industries and media in which they work is not currently 
captured by representative organisations. Examples of performers absent, or less present in 
collective representation, despite their strong contribution to the UK’s creative industries and 
heritage sector, include voice-over performers (Pavis & Tulti 2019), dance artists (Waelde 
2021),34 and Reality TV participants. 
This contrasts with the position of authors (for the purpose of copyright) for which more 
structured and active collective representation is available. At present, performers’ rights, notably 
performers’ equitable remuneration rights are perceived within the field as ‘not worth’ organising 
for, or defending in court, due to the limited benefits they bring by contrast to the cost of 
enforcement.  
Unless comprehensive collective representation is in place, a vast number of performers will not 
receive the benefit of equitable remuneration rights. Raising the standard of protection for 
performers under the CDPA, is likely to generate further incentive within the relevant industries 
to organise collective representation.  
 
Commentary to Question 9 
Observation 15 — Freedom of contract and the fair remuneration objective of performers’ 
rights 
Existing rules protect the principle of freedom of contract to the detriment of the objective of fair 
remuneration of the UK framework of performers’ rights. The majority of performers are not in 
the position to leverage the freedom of contract afforded to them by the CDPA due to lack of 
legal knowledge or contractual bargaining power. As a result, they lose out on key benefits of the 
UK framework of performers’ rights.  
The CDPA imposes very few formal requirements or conditions to the formation of contracts 
arranging the transfer of performers’ rights (assignments or licences). The main consequence of 
the non-regulation of the transfer of performers’ rights means that once a contract has been formed 
the protection conferred by the CDPA is spent, and the matter is governed by principles of 
contract law.  
 
 
34 Charlotte Waelde, Submission to the call for views on audio-visual performances to the UK 




Ongoing research evidences that the compatibility between principles of contract, law and the 
remuneration policy of the CDPA is low (Pavis and others 2020-21).35 Existing common law 
and statutory principles of contract law provide little in the form of effective regulation and 
protection against unfair terms for performers’ contracts. Regulation of unfair terms excludes 
contractual transfers of intellectual property rights.36 The doctrines of illegality, restraint of trade, 
duress, or undue influence have yielded little result in protection performers’ interests against the 
transfer of their rights on the basis of unfair terms (Pavis and others 2020-21).37  
Performers' weak bargaining position is a well-known and evidenced fact. It was addressed by 
Member States of the European Union in the context of the Directive on Copyright in the Single 
Market (Directive 2019/790, Articles 18 to 23). Similar changs to the law are under consideration 
at EU level for transfers of rights between consumers and online service providers (Loos & Luzak 
2021).38  
Regulations and case law in France have addressed this question by regulating contractual terms 
of transfers to protect and strengthen the rightsholders’ bargaining position. For example, 
regulatory measures include declaring any transfer of IPR in future works or performances as null 
and void; requiring that the assignment or exclusive licensing of each economic rights be listed 
individually, indicating the corresponding remuneration (French Intellectual Property Code, 
Article L131-1 to L131-9 on copyright; Article L212-3 on performers’ rights). These measures 
have contributed to strengthening the contractual position of performers by limiting unfair 
contractual terms and certain oppressive contractual practices (UFC-Que Choisir v Twitter 
(2018); UFC-Que Choisir v Google (2019); UFC-Que Choisir v Facebook Inc (2019); Pavis 
2018, Pavis 2019).39 
Performers are particularly vulnerable in two situations: when the commercialisation of their 
performance is subject to chain of contracts (combining assignments and licences); and when 







35 Research conducted by Pavis and the class of 2020-21 (LAW2004B) on contract law and the 
remuneration policy of intellectual property rights (unpublished, 2020-21). Findings available by 
request to Mathilde Pavis (email: M.Pavis@exeter.ac.uk). 
36 Unfair Contract Terms Act 1997, Sch. 1, s.1(c) 
37 Research conducted by Pavis and the class of 2020-21 (LAW2004B) on contract law and the 
remuneration policy of intellectual property rights (unpublished, 2020-21). Findings available on 
request to Mathilde Pavis (email: M.Pavis@exeter.ac.uk).  
38 Marco Loos and Joasia Luzak, ‘Update the unfair contract terms directive for digital services’ 
(February 2021, Study requested by the JURI committee, European Parliament) 10-20; 40-41. 
39 Paris Tribunal (Tribunal de Grande Instance), UFC-Que Choisir v Twitter (9 August 2018); UFC-
Que Choisir v Google Inc (12 February 2019); UFC-Que Choisir v Facebook Inc. (9 April 2019). 
Mathilde Pavis, ‘Paris Tribunal guts Twitter’s T&C’s ...including clause fo user-generated content’ The 
IPKat (26 September 2018); Mathilde Pavis ‘Paris Tribunal strikes again and guts Google’s 
T&C’s...including its copyright clauses for user-generated content’ The IPKAT (15 March 2019); 
Mathilde Pavis ‘Things come in threes – Paris Tribunal guts Facebook’s T&C’s’, The IPKat Blog (6 




Chain of contracts  
 
Performers’ contractual vulnerability in chains of contracts transferring their intellectual property 
is attributed to the precedent set in Barker v Stickney (1919) (on copyright).40 According to Barker 
v Stickney, it is possible for an assignee who has acquired performers’ rights from a performer on 
the condition that the performer receives royalties proportionate to the exploitation of the 
performance, to re-assign these rights to a third party without passing on the obligation of royalty 
payment. As a result, the third party is not contractually bound to pay royalties to the performer, 
even though they benefit from the exploitation of their performance. This ruling is consistent with 
the principle that the benefit of a contract can be re-assigned but not the burden.  
 
There are ways around the Barker v Stickney rule but these are uncertain and yet to be tested in 
court (Adams 2007; Arnold 2016).41 A better solution would be to modify the provisions of the 
CDPA so as to exclude the rule of Barker v Stickney, and require that the re-assignment or re-
licensing of performers’ rights carry both benefits and burdens.  
 
Online marketplaces  
 
A review of online peer-to-peer recruitment platforms’ contracts performed by the research team 
indicate that their terms and conditions do not reference, signal or raise the possible application 
of equitable remuneration rights (Pavis & Tulti 2019).42 This includes platforms operated by 
companies registered in England & Wales, or whose standard form contract nominates the laws 
of England & Wales as applicable to their agreement.  
The contractual practice of peer-to-peer recruitment platforms also indicates that full assignment 
of intellectual property rights are introduced without clear and transparent notification to the 
parties, without providing a genuine opportunity of negotiation, and last but not least, without 
appropriate financial compensation. 
The fact that peer-to-peer recruitment platforms apply this practice to all transactions, and on a 
global scale, adds cause for concern. As such, the terms of use currently applied by peer-to-peer 
recruitment platforms hold the potential to defeat the purpose of the intellectual property 
framework, circumventing measures put in place to ensure equitable remuneration for protected 
artists.  
This type of contractual practice is currently under review in the context of consumer protection 




40 Barker v Stickney [1919] 1 KB 121. 
41 John Adams, ‘The Passing of the burden of royalty payments’ (2007) 4 Intellectual Property 
Quarterly 403; Richard Arnold, Performers’ rights (Sweet and Maxwell, 2016) 298. 
42 Mathilde Pavis, Huda Tulti and Jo Pye, ‘Fair pay/play in the UK voice-over industries: a survey of 
200+ voice-overs’ (Center for Science, Culture and the Law at Exeter, 2019) 
43 Marco Loos and Joasia Luzak, ‘Update the unfair contract terms directive for digital services’ 





Existing rules under the CDPA could be improved with modifications aimed at limiting the 
principle of freedom of contract where it does not serve or protect performers’ interests.  
Such modifications could include:  
(a)  Introducing new conditions of enforceability of contracts transferring performers’ rights 
similar to those enforced in France under the Intellectual Property Code, adapted to the 
UK’s legal tradition on performers’ rights and contracts;  
(b)  Introducing new provisions inspired by the Directive adapt to the UK’s legal tradition 
on performers’ rights and contracts. 
(c)  Introducing new conditions to exclude the Barker v Stickney rule.  
 
Commentary to Question 12 
 
Observation 16 — the definition and treatment of ‘sound tracks’ under the CDPA 
 
There is uncertainty surrounding the treatment of ‘sound recordings’ and ‘soundtracks’ in films 
due to the definitions provided under Part 1 of the CDPA (s.5B(3)).  
 
Section 5B(3) specifies that the soundtrack of a film is to be treated as part of the ‘film’ and not 
regarded as a separate sound recording when it is communicated to the public or showed/played 
in public (for the purpose of copyright, Part 1). The provision simplifies the enforcement of 
copyright in films and sound recordings. However, it is unclear how the provision applies to 
protected performanced fixed in sound recordings, and their subsequently use in films. This point 
of law is particularly important in circumstances when different parts of a recorded performance 
is used, for different purposes.44  
 
For example, a voice-over actor may fix their voice-over performance for the purpose of a 
television advertisement, a documentary or animated film. The sound recording is (pre)exists, 
separate, from the sound track of the film, and will be integrated into it at a second stage. Is the 
sound recording protected as a stand alone recording of a protected performance under 
performers’ rights?  
 
 
44 Certain acts controlled by performers’ rights apply whether the ‘whole or a substantial part’ of a 
performance in which performers’ rights subsist. There is no statutory definition of what constitutes ‘a 
substantial part’ of a performance. The expression is likely to be interpreted by courts to mean the same 
as the use of ‘the whole or a substantial part’ of a copyright work under Part 1 of the CDPA.  The 
expression is likely to be interpreted by courts to mean the same as the use of ‘the whole or a substantial 
part’ of a copyright work under Part 1 of the CDPA. If so, a ‘substantial part of a performance’ will be 
interpreted qualitatively and quantitatively. See, Designers Guild Ltd v Russell Williams (textiles) Ltd 
(trading as Washington DC) [2000] UKHL 58, [2001] 1 All ER 700; Ladbroke v William Hill [1964] 




Another scenario may involve a performer producing their own sound recording of their musical 
performance, added to the sound track of a film by a third party, at a later stage. This is common 
practice in the production of films for the purpose of entertainment as well as advertisement.  
Should this subsequent use of the soundtrack be treated as the exploitation of a film or the 
exploitation of a sound recording? Should this subsequent use require the consent of the 
performer? We think it should, to confer performers with a robust level of protection. Yet, current 
provisions could be interpreted to mean that once a sound recording is integrated into a film, 
subsequent use of the film (and the sound recording in its sound track) no longer requires the 
performers’ consent or equitable remuneration. 
 
Conversely, it is not clear how the provision would apply to performances fixed in film but from 
which only the sound recording (or sound track) is subsequently (i.e .without the moving images 
capturing the visual dimension of the performance). For example, the performance of an actor 
may be fixed in a film, and the sound track subsequently used for the purpose of an audio-only 
release via the radio or online platforms. Should this subsequent use of the soundtrack be treated 
as the exploitation of a film or the exploitation of a sound recording? Should this subsequent use 
require the consent of the performer? We think it should, to confer performers with a robust level 
of protection.  
 
 
This lack of clarity on the treatment negatively impacts on the application of existing equitable 
remuneration rights applicable to sound recording, and the right to communication, show/play a 
recorded performance in public. These issues will be repeated in the reformed version of the 





Any recording of sound capturing a protected performance capturing a protected performance 
should be treated as a sound recording, regardless of the purpose or context in which it was made. 
Treating certain sound recording as ‘sound tracks’ of films risks complicating the enforcement of 
performers’ rights and prejudicing the interest and protection of performers. Voice-over 
performers, in particular, would be negatively affected by the treatment of sound tracks as a part 
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